AASA on Religion in Schools
He's right, and this is a serious problem. Far too many administrators and teachers simply don't know even the most basic things about what is and isn't allowed in public schools in terms of religion. That's why we get situations coming up where some kid is told he can't hand out candy canes with bible verses attached to them, or can't read their Bible during lunch. In 1994 and again in 2000, the Department of Education tried to fix this by sending out a document to every public school in the nation explaining what the law says, but it appears that most schools didn't bother to do anything with it. As Haynes notes: From northern California to southern Florida, we encounter far too many superintendents who are reluctant to touch religion with the proverbial 10-foot pole. Following the let-sleeping-dogs-lie approach to administration, they start to think about First Amendment solutions only after a fight breaks out. By then it's often too late to avert a bitter legal battle that divides the community and erodes support for public education. I would bet that's the case in 90% of the schools around the country, probably more. He also provides an excellent example of what schools should do: By contrast, the school district in Richardson, Texas, was smart enough to buy the fire truck before the fire. Under the leadership of Carolyn Bukhair, superintendent from 1996 through 2004, the district appointed a task force of parents, religious leaders and school staff to develop guidelines for religious practices that cover everything from student prayer to religion in the curriculum. Rather than reacting to a crisis or lawsuit, this superintendent acted out of her conviction that bringing stakeholders to the table and involving them in decision-making creates stronger public schools. If only that would happen more often. Haynes also points out that there are still some particular situations that haven't been resolved, and some controversy over the legal advice the Bush administration has given to schools: Although the Bush-era guidance tracks much of what is found in the national agreements of the 1990s, watchdog groups such as Americans United for Separation of Church and State argue that the new guidelines go too far by endorsing student religious expression at school-sponsored events. Even though the lower courts are divided on where schools should draw the line on student religious speech at graduation and other school programs, the DOE now takes the position that school officials may not restrict students' religious (or anti-religious) speech if student speakers are selected by "genuinely neutral, evenhanded criteria" and students retain "primary control" over the content. I actually agree with the DOE guidelines in regard to allowing religious speech even with a captive audience as long as the speakers were chosen according to some objective criteria and if the content of the speech is determined by the student and not the school (that's why I think that the school was wrong in the Britanny McCombs case). But that's a fairly unsettled legal question. Still, if schools would have some sort of coherent policy on those matters, they would avoid a lot of problems. Unfortunately, not all the essays in the issue are as accurate as the one by Haynes. Colby May, an attorney with Pat Robertson's American Center for Law and Justice, has an article that contains a highly dishonest representation of the Kitzmiller ruling. He writes: Many school leaders would be surprised to learn that the Supreme Court said the following about evolutionary theory in Edwards v. Aguillard in 1987: "We do not imply that a legislature could never require that scientific critiques of prevailing scientific theories be taught. . . . [T]eaching a variety of scientific theories about the origins of humankind to schoolchildren might be validly done with the clear secular intent of enhancing the effectiveness of science instruction." This is a distortion both of Edwards and Kitzmiller. Intent was only one aspect of both cases, and a relatively small one (particularly in Kitzmiller). To claim that the "primary problem" in the Dover case was the "religious motivation" of the board is to ignore about 90% of the ruling and all of the voluminous detail it goes into regarding the effect prong and the endorsement test. May clearly implies that if the school board just didn't show a religious purpose, the policy would have been constitutional; the ruling very, very clearly shows how absurd that claim is.
AASA on Religion in Schools | 3 comments (3 topical, 0 hidden)
AASA on Religion in Schools | 3 comments (3 topical, 0 hidden)
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